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NOTES

The First Amendment v. Right of Publicity in
Theatrical Imitations-A Delicate Balance
The right of publicity enables celebrities1 to protect the use of
their name or likeness from commercial exploitation by others. The
right also permits celebrities to demand a share of the profits others
realize from such commercial exploitations. 2 In two recent decisions,
federal courts held that theatrical imitations3 of a celebrity, without
the celebrity's or his heirs' permission, constituted a wrongful appropriation of the celebrity's name and likeness, and thus violated his
I For purposes of this note, celebrities are persons who are able to profit from their fame
through endorsements and personal appearances.
2 The right of publicity developed as famous people attempted to prevent the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses. Initially, they alleged that the unauthorized uses violated their right to privacy. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales, Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315, U.S. 823 (1942); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 203 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952). The complaint in these cases, however, was not that the individuals received unwanted publicity, but that they had failed to reap its benefits. Felcher & Rubin, Priva,
Publicityand the PortrayalofRealPeople by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1588 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Felcher & Rubin]. In 1953, the right of publicity was judicially recognized as a right
distinct from the right of privacy. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). There, the court noted: "We think
that, in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy. . . a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture ...
." Id at 868.
Since 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the third, sixth, eighth,
and ninth circuits and state courts in California, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin have recognized the right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
[both the Ohio Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court recognized the right];
Memphis Dev., Etc. v. Factors, Etc. Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114
Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E. 2d 496 (1966); Canessa v. J.I. Kislick, Inc. ,97 N.J. Super. 319, 235
A.2d 62 (1967); Russell v. Marboro Books 18 Misc. 2d 182, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 8 (1959); Hirsch v.
S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979). See also Felcher & Rubin
at 1589.
3 Theatrical imitations are imitations presented on stage or screen for an audience.
Theatrical imitations are thus distinguished from imitations presented as commerical
advertisements.
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right of publicity. 4 However, since the Supreme Court of the United

States has ruled that entertainment is protected first amendment
speech,5 these decisions raise the question whether and to what extent the first amendment guarantee of free speech limits a celebrity's
or his heirs' ability to protect the celebrity's name or likeness from
6
unauthorized use.

This note examines theatrical imitations and the clash between
the right of publicity and the first amendment guarantee of free
speech. Part I analyzes judicial standards used in prior right of publicity cases to determine when the first amendment precludes a right
of publicity action; Part II determines the appropriateness of these
standards in theatrical imitation cases; and Part III proposes a test
for determining when the first amendment precludes a right of publicity action in theatrical imitation cases and then analyzes the proposed test by applying it to two recent theatrical imitation cases.
I.

The First Amendment and The Right of Publicity-A
Balancing Test

Although theatrical imitation actions are the most recent right
of publicity cases involving first amendment questions, the first
amendment has been at issue in many earlier right of publicity
cases. 7 In these cases, the courts balanced the celebrity's interest in
prohibiting the unauthorized use of his name or likeness against the
user's first amendment right of free speech.8
A. News and Newsworthy Figures
The first amendment guarantees have traditionally been most
rigidly enforced in news and newsworthy figure cases. 9 The first
amendment guarantees "[a]t least the liberty to discuss publicly and
4 Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Marx v. Day and Night
Productions, 50 U.S.L.W. 2229 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1981).
5 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
6 See generally, Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2 at 1590; Sims, Right of Publicity:
Survivability Reconsidered, 49.FORDiiAM L. REv. 453, 485 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sims];
Note, Human CannonbalsandtheFirstAmendment, 30 STANFORD L. REV. 1185 (1978); Note, The
Right of Publicity -Protectionfor Public K'gures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 549
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Right of Publiity].
7 See. e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S. 2d 828, 75 A.D. 768 (1980);
Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
8 Sims, supra note 6, at 486-97.
9 Id at 485.
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truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment."1 0 Protecting publication of newsworthy items from undue restraint advances this objective. A right
of publicity permitting a celebrity to prohibit or punish the dissemination of news would contravene the first amendment policy aims.
Paulsen v. Personality Posters' Inc. 11 illustrates how far courts will
go to protect the publication and distribution of newsworthy matters.
There, Paulsen, a well-known comedian, brought a right of privacy
action' 2 to enjoin the defendant from distributing a poster commemorating Paulsen's candidacy in the 1968 presidential campaign. He
alleged that the poster was an unauthorized appropriation of his
name and likeness. Paulsen also contended that the poster was commercial speech and, therefore, unprotected by the first amendment.13
The court held otherwise, noting:
[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters the presidential ring,
tongue-in-cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public
interest. .

.

. [and] it is sufficiently a matter of public interest to be

a form of expression which is4 constitutionally protected and deserving of substantial freedom.'
Yet, the First Amendment protection afforded newsworthy matters is not without limits. In Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting
Co. ,15 the Supreme Court upheld a right of publicity action brought
in response to a news broadcast of an entire "human cannonball"
act, without the performer's consent. The court emphasized the right
of publicity's economic aspect in holding that a broadcast of
Zacchini's entire act posed a substantial threat to the performer's
6
ability to profit from his act and thus violated his right of publicity.'
The Court recognized that its decision would not prevent a news report about the performance, but it would prevent a rebroadcast of
the entire act.' 7 The Court analogized the unauthorized rebroadcast
10 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
11 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
12 The plaintiff brought this action under § 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. This
statute created a cause of action resembling the right of publicity, because it authorizes injunctive relief and damages where a person's "name, portrait or picture is used ... for advertising purposes or for the purpose of trade." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1980). See note 24 and accompanying text infta.
13 Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 505.
14 Id at 507.
15 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
16 Id at 574-75.
17 Id at 575.
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to an unauthorized broadcast of an entire copyrighted dramatic
work or a baseball game. 18 The Zacchini holding places some limit on
the first amendment protection of newsworthy items, but short of an
entire rebroadcast, right of publicity actions concerning news or
newsworthy items will probably fail.
B.

Literaqy Works

Courts and commentators have noted that literary works, such
as biographies and fiction, often serve the same interests as news or
newsworthy items. Literary works share with news the function of
informing the public about people and events. 19 In addition, literary
works are a product of the creative activity which our society values. 20 For these reasons, courts have granted literary works substantial First Amendment protection in right of publicity actions, subject
2
to certain limited exceptions. '
Courts have refused to grant first amendment protection to literary works that intentionally mislead the public. 22 In Spahn v.Julian
AMessner, Inc. ,23 a well-known baseball player brought an action under
the New York "Privacy Right" statute, alleging that publication of
his unauthorized biography violated his right to privacy. 24 The New
York Court of Appeals noted that "[c]ourts have engrafted exceptions and restrictions onto the [right of privacy] statute to avoid conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy
18 Id
19 "[b]ooks... are vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated ...
Id Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod. 25 Cal. 3d
860, 867, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357, 603 P.2d 454, 459 (1979); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at
1598; Sims, supra note 6, at 488.
20 Hicks, 464 F. Supp at 430.
21 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at 1598.
22 The first amendment does not preclude a right of privacy action, Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967), or a libel action by a public official, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), against the author of a story that is known to be false or is written with
reckless disregard to its truth or falsity.
A corollary application of these principles is in cases where a celebrity's picture is used
to "draw attention" to an article that is unrelated to the celebrity. This misleading use of the
celebrity's picture has been found to be outside First Amendment protection. See, Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. No. 77 Civ. 1782, Dec. 30, 1977); Grant v. Esquire, Inc. 367 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y 1973).
23 18 N.Y. 2d 324, 221 N.E. 2d 453, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, ad,
21 N.Y. 2d 124, 233 N.W. 2d 840, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1967). See also Sims, sufira note 6, at
488.
24 .S'pahn, 221 N.E. 2d at 544. See note 12, supra.
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events and matters of public interest. ' 25 The court determined that
public figures were considered an exception to the statute so that the
law provided little protection to the celebrity's privacy.2 6 The court
ruled, however, that the public figure exception did not apply to a
"purported" biography containing "[a] host, a preponderant percentage, of factual errors, distortions and fanciful passages ....
In a later "biography case," Hicks v. Casablanca Records,28 the
heirs of mystery writer Agatha Christie brought a right of publicity
action to enjoin the distribution of a movie and book entitled Agatha .29 In dismissing the complaint, the court ruled that "the right of
publicity does not attach here, where a fictionalized account of an
event in the life of a public figure is depicted in a novel or a movie,
and in such novel or movie it is evident to the public that the events
so depicted are fictitious. 30 Hicks limits Spahn by allowing right of
publicity actions only in cases where fictionalizations are presented as
fact rather than fiction. Thus, absent deliberate falsifications or attempts to confuse the public, the first amendment protection of free
expression outweighs the asserted right of publicity in literary work
cases.
The courts' concern for first amendment interests in Spahn and
Hicks is not limited to biographical works. In Frosch v. Grosset &Dunlap, Inc. ,31 the New York Supreme Court held that publication of
Norman Mailer's book, Mar4lyn, did not violate the Monroe estate's
right of publicity. Although the estate's executor disputed the book's
characterization as a biography, the court maintained that "[I]t is
' 32
not for a court to pass on literary categories, or literary judgment.
Rather, the court determined that the only question is whether the
work is a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.3 3 Since Mariiyn was more than a disguised advertisement,
the court concluded that it was entitled to first amendment
25 221 N.E. 2d at 544-45. See note 30 and accompanying text, infa.
26 221 N.E. 2d at 544-45.
27 Id at 546.
28 464 F. Supp. 426 (1978).
29 Id See note 56 infa for a discussion of the descendibility of the right of publicity.
30 464 F. Supp. at 433. The Hicks court noted that the privileges and exemptions engrafted upon the Privacy Right Statute (the cause of action in Spahn) are also engrafted upon
the right of publicity. The court's list of exemptions included "[m]atters of news, his" Id at 430.
tory,biography and other factual subjects of public interest ...
31 427 N.Y.S. 2d 828, 75 A.D. 2d 768 (1980).
32 427 N.Y.S. 2d at 829.
33 Id
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protection.3 4
Frosch did not apply or even mention the Hicks test.3 5 Since
Frosch apparently did not overrule Hicks, it seems that both stan36
dards would apply in right of publicity attacks on literary works.
Thus, New York courts will probably protect literary works from
right of publicity attacks unless the works are disguised advertisements or they mislead the public as to their true nature. If a literary
work passes these "tests", the first amendment protections apply.

C.

Commercial Speech

Right of publicity actions have been most successful in actions
against advertisers who use the celebrity's name or likeness to sell a
product.37 Indeed, courts first recognized the right of publicity in an
action brought by a baseball player attempting to assign an exclusive
38
right to use his picture on a bubble gum card.
These "commercial speech" cases have been successful for two
reasons. First, an unauthorized commercial use of an entertainer's
name or likeness causes a readily identifiable economic harm.3 9 It
gives a false impression of a business relationship between the advertiser and the celebrity, and deprives the celebrity of the advertiser's
usual endorsement fee.4° Second, the courts have been reluctant to
extend first amendment protection to commercial speech. Commercial advertising generally lacks the values considered worthy of constitutional protection. 4' Hence, while a newsworthy figure may be
34 Id
35 The opinion in Frosch was a brief memorandum decision.
36 While the analysis focuses exclusively on cases decided by New York State Courts and
Federal Courts located in New York, these holdings are persuasive authority in the right of
publicity and entertainment law areas. The right of publicity originated in New York, and
has developed there through a 27 year line of cases. Note, Elvis Pres y: The New Twists, 1
ENTERTAINMENT LJ. 31, 36 (1981). In addition, New York has been referred to as "mT1he
fountainhead of [the entertainment] medium.. ." Gordon, Right ofPropertyin Name, Likeness,
Personalityand Histoqy, 55 NW UNIv. L. REv. 553, 583 (1960).
37 Sims, supra note 6, at 493. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), remanded 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), reo'd
on other gromds, 652 F.2d 278 (1981); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969);
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Cum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953).
38 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
39 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at 1613-16.
40 Id at 1614. See also, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 835, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 336, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (1979) (Bird, C.J. dissenting).
41 Sims, supra note 6, at 492-93. But see Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Com'n. of
N.Y. 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (1980). (The government's power to restrict commercial communi-
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the proper subject of news or an informative presentation, the privi42
lege does not extend to a commercialization of his personality.
Therefore, while courts have recognized that some commercial
speech does convey important information protected by the first
amendment, most right of publicity actions involving commercial
43
speech have overcome first amendment challenges.
II.

The Inadequacies of Existing Standards

News or newsworthy items, literary works, and commercial
speech are the categories of speech found in most right of publicity
actions. However, the theatrical imitations involved in two recent
decisions present special categorization problems. On the one hand,
the Supreme Court has held that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys first amendment protection. 44 On the other hand, entertainment is a commercial enterprise conducted for private profit. Thus,
entertainment could be regarded as a form of commercial speech,
subject to minimal first amendment protection. 45 Courts have recognized that entertainment conveys ideas and information, as do literary works; 46 thus, they have balanced the conflicting free expression
and right of publicity interests in a manner similar to literary work
cases.

47

The balancing approaches used in literary work cases vary, however, depending on the nature of the literary work involved. Spahn
and Hicks hold that biographies must be essentially truthful or be
48
presented in a manner that indicates the work's fictitious nature.
But in Frosch the test was whether the literary work was "a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services."' 49 While
cation which is neither misleading nor unlawful must be supported by a substantial interest);
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willinboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 435 U.S. 748 (1976).
42 Sims, supra note 6, at 494.
43 See note 37 supra.
44 Zacchini v. Scripps - Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See also, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
45 This is basically the New York district court's attitude in Marx v.Day and Nght Produclions, 50 U.S.L.W. 2229 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1981). Contra, Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 360, 603 P.2d 454, 462 (1979) ("[Respondent's] interest in financial gain in producing the film did not affect the constitutional stature
of respondent's undertaking ..
46 See note 19 supra.
47 Id
48 See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
49 See notes 32-35 upra and accompanying text.
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Frosch provides much first amendment protection, and Spahn and
Hicks prevent deception and misrepresentation, none of these decisions adequately protects a celebrity seeking to preserve a style developed through years of hard work. 0
The right of publicity protects a celebrity's interest in maintaining this style.5 ' One commentator has stated that, "[t]he public interest will support the sporadic, occasional and good faith imitation
of a famous person to achieve humor, to effect criticism or to season a
particular episode, but it does npt give a privilege to appropriate another's valuable attributes as one's own without the consent of the
other.15 2 The Frosch standard would protect the celebrity's interest
only in cases involving disguised advertisements for goods and services. 53 The Frosch standard would thus provide no protection from
theatrical imitations which are not advertisements. In addition, an
imitator usually does not mislead the public. An imitator's audience
normally knows the performance is an imitation and not the real
thing. Hence, the Spahn/Hicks standard would not protect the celeb54
rity from most theatrical imitations.
In two recent federal district court decisions involving theatrical
imitations, the courts did not apply the standards set forth in literary
work cases. In their attempt to protect the celebrity's right of publicity, however, the courts may have infringed upon legitimate first
amendment interests.
In Estate of Presley v. Russen, the estate of Elvis Presley obtained
an injunction prohibiting production of the Big El Show, a concert
performance featuring an Elvis imitator.55 In Marx v. Day and Night
Productions, the heirs5 6 of the Marx Brothers obtained a summary
50 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal 3d 813, 834, 160 Cal. Rptr 323, 336, 603 P.2d 425,
438 (1979) (Bird, CJ. dissenting).
51

Id

Netterville, Copyrght and Tort Aspecs ofParody, Mimicry and Humourous CommentaV, 35 S.
CAL. L. REV. 225, 254 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Netterville].
53 See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
54 See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra.
55 Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D.N.J. 1981).
56 In Marx and Presl, the plaintiffs were descendents of the celebrities. Although both
courts agreed that the right of publicity survives the celebrity's death, other courts have split
on the issue. The split revolves around the right of publicity's characterization. Since the
celebrity is able to profit from selling the rights to his name and likeness, many courts characterize the right as a property interest. Thus, these courts have held that the right should
descend at death just as any other property right would. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See generall
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2 at 1618; Sims, supra note 6 at 453-84; Note, The Right of
52

Publiity,supra note 6 at 541-49.

The courts that refuse to recognize the right's descendibility stress that the right is essen-

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1982]

judgment against the producers of the play A Day inHoll wood/A
Night in the Ukraine.57 The play's second act featured Marx Brothers
mimics in a spoof of Marx Brothers style films. In each case, the
plaintiffs maintained that their inherited right of publicity in the
Presley and Marx Brothers names and likenesses prohibited the unauthorized imitations in the defendants' performances. 58
Although both courts agreed that the defendants' failure to obtain permission to perform the imitations violated the plaintiffs' inherited right of publicity, 59 their rationales differed. The New Jersey
District Court in Presle focused on the theatrical imitation's lack of
creativity and information. 60 The District Court for Southern New
York in Marx characterized the play as a misappropriation of the
Marx Brothers characters for commercial purposes and, therefore,
61
outside first amendment protection.
These rulings are essentially ad hoc determinations. In each
case, the courts weighed the first amendment and right of publicity
interests to determine which demanded greater protection in thatpartitular case.62 Unfortunately, this ad hoc process creates uncertainty
and may inhibit creative work, because people cannot judge whether
a court will protect their work. 63 This uncertainty may have a "chilling effect" on a party's right of free speech. 64 This "chilling effect" is
"[p]articularly pernicious where speech is concerned because it tends
tially a personal interest. They consider it so unique to the celebrity that it is not devisable.
See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc. Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 358 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603
P.2d 425 (1979).
57 Marx, 50 U.S.L.W. 2229 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1981).
58 Id. at 2229, Presle at 1339.
59 50 U.S.L.W. at 2230; 513 F. Supp. at 1361.
60 Preslq, 513 F. Supp. at 1360.
61 Marx, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2230.
62 Goetsch, Parody as FreeSpeech - The Replacement ofthe FairUse DoctrineBy FirstAmendment
Protection, 3 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 39, 59 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goetsch].
63 Id at 59; Nimmer, The Right to Speakftom Times to Time: FirstAmendment Theo Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to th'vag, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 939 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Nimmer].
64 The "void for vagueness" doctrine the Supreme Court applies to statutes governing
speech illustrates its concern for clear standards in the free speech area. Under this doctrine,
the court strikes down statutes that fail to give "clear standards as to the nature of speech for
which [an individual] can be punished." Nowak, Rotunda, Young, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
726 (1978). See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 Central Hudson
Gas v. Public Service Com'n of N.Y., 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980); Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willinboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 435 U.S. 748 (1976). But See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Groucho Marx Productions Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. No. 77 Civ.
1782, Dec. 30, 1977); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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to deter all but the most courageous (not necessarily the most rational) from entering the market place of ideas." 65 In addition, this
standardless ad hoc process necessarily places much discretion in the
judge. Absent a standard, a judge may be too easily swayed by
66
strong popular opinion when balancing the conflicting interests.
Finally, the focus in Marx on "commercialization" distorts the analysis. By applying "commercial analysis," courts allow more restrictions on speech. Two reasons exist for not doing so here: (1)
entertainment is protected speech, and is not commercial in the same
sense as advertising 67 and (2) the trend is to give informative com68
mercial speech more protection.
Thus, while the literary works tests fail to adequately protect the
celebrity's interest, the ad hoc process falls to adequately protect the
first amendment interest. A new test is needed, therefore, to protect
both interests.
III.

Proposed Test

To avoid the ad hoc analysis and its attendant problems in other
areas involving speech, the Supreme Court has frequently used a definitional analysis. 69 Under a definitional analysis, the Court balances
the speech and nonspeech interests by defining in advance what is
protected first amendment speech.70 The definition then provides a
consistent standard for judging whether the speech in question
should receive first amendment protection. Rather than balancing
the conflicting interest in each case, the trial court merely decides
whether the speech meets the definitional standards. Thus, the balancing is actually done when the court adopts a particular definition.
While some may disagree with the definition the court chooses, a
writer or performer at least has some notice of what speech the court
65 Nimmer, supra note 63, at 939.
66 id at 940.
67 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
68 Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Com'n of N.Y., 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980);
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willinboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). cf Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grouch Marx Productions Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. (S.D.N.Y No. 77 Civ. 1782, Dec. 30, 1977); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
69 Goetsch, supra note 62 at 59. The Supreme Court has developed definitional tests in
the obscenity, privacy, and libel areas. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (privacy); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (libel).
70 Goetsch, sumra note 62, at 59.
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will protect. The standard limits the judge's discretion and, therefore, avoids a chilling effect which might otherwise inhibit protected
speech.
One commentator proposes a definitional analysis (the Goetsch
analysis) for use in copyright infringement cases that seems particularly well suited for theatrical imitation cases. 7 1 Under the Goetsch
analysis, works which the courts determine to be legal parody would
receive first amendment protection. This protection would preclude
right of publicity actions brought to restrain the work. Legal parody,
for our purposes, is defined as a recognizably distinct work developed
from a previous, indentifiable work through the use of satiric imita72
tion and invention.
This analysis focuses on whether the disputed work bears the
author's creative touch. The amount of material the imitator appropriates from the original work and the imitator's motivation for creating the work are irrelevant. 73 Thus, the Goetsch analysis would
protect celebrities from appropriations of their name or likeness in
imitations devoid of creative input, while protecting works which use
imitations to contribute original thoughts to the "market place of
71 Goetsch, supra note 62. Goetsch actually proposes his test for use in copyright infringement cases. He argues that the "fair use" test courts currently use for determining whether a
copy violates the original work's copyright is essentially an inadequate ad hoc test. The "fair
use" test focuses on the amount of material copied from the original work and the copier's
commercial motivation. Hence, a copy which appropriates a substantial amount of original
material will likely violate the original's copyright, as will a copy made primarily for commercial purposes. The Goetsch analysis eliminates the "fair use" test and seeks to protect the
copyright holder's economic interest vis-a-vis the copier's first amendment interest. It is accomplished through the use of a definitional test that eliminates the need for ad hoc considerations of the amount appropriated and the copier's motivation.
The Goetsch analysis is applicable to right of publicity actions, as well as to copyright
actions because the interests are so similar. Copyright laws protect against the unauthorized
appropriation of work created by another. This protection encourages creativity by ensuring
that others will not profit unjustly from the protected work. Goetsch, supra note 62 at. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 USC app. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). The right of publicity
protects a celebrity's name or likeness from unauthorized use by another. The right thus
encourages persons to achieve recognition and fame by protecting their ability to profit from
their notoriety. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at 1618-19; Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility
ofthe Right ofPubliciy: Is There CommercialLift After Death? 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1130-31 (1980).
The Supreme Court has analogized the right of publicity to copyright law (Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)), and other courts and commentators have suggested copyright law as a guideline for placing durational limits on the existence of a right of publicity. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 n. 10 (1981);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 862, 864, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355, 603
P.2d 454, 457 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,
344, 603 P.2d 425, 446 (1979) (Bird C.J. dissenting).
72 Goetsch, supra note 62, at 43.
73 Id at 53.
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ideas."174 Application of the Goetsch analysis to Presley and Marx il75
lustrates its use in, and impact upon, theatrical imitation cases.
In Presley, the objectional activity was a theatrical presentation
entitled the "Big El Show." The show essentially recreated an Elvis
Presley concert and featured a mimic who looked, dressed, and sang
like Elvis. The show opened with a band playing the theme from the
movie "2001 - A Space Odyssey" (the song Elvis had used to open his
76
concerts) and continued as the mimic sang popular Presley songs.
The Goetsch analysis requires some showing of creativity or satiric invention for a disputed work to receive protected legal parody
status. In Presle, no such showing was made. As the court aptly
stated, the "[Big El] [s]how serves primarily to commercially exploit
the likeness of Elvis Presley without contributing anything of substantial value to society.' '7 7 The court compared the Big El Show to
the wholesale appropriation of an "entire act" found objectionable in
Zacchini.78 The court saw little difference in showing an
unauthorized film of an Elvis Presley concert and presenting a live
79
recreation starring an Elvis imitator.
More importantly, the court noted that the Big El Show was not
part of a new and different work.80 Rather, the show was mere imitation, lacking the creative invention inherent in legal parody. Indeed,
the court invited the defendant to supplement the trial record and
establish that the Big El Show added creative elements so that it
could be considered a distinct work.8 ' Since no showing was made,
no legal parody existed, and the performance would not warrant first
amendment protection under a Goetsch analysis.
Marx, on the other hand, provides an example of a work that
would be protected under the legal parody standard. Marx involved
A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine, a two-act musical comedy
written by Frank Vosburgh, a film critic and historian. Vosburgh
74 Netterville, supra note 52 at 254.
75 Although the courts have not yet adopted the Goetsch analysis, the protection afforded parody has recently been expanded. In Elsmere Musci, Inc. v. NationalBroadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741 (1980), the court held that "[t]he issue to be resolved [in copyright infringement cases] by a court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody and not
whether it is a parody of the copied. . . [work] itself. Id at 746. Hence, the parodist needn't
parody the copied work itself, so long as the use is part of a volid satire or parody.
76 Presl/,, 513 F. Supp. at 1348.
77 Id at 1359.
78 Id at 1361.
79 Id
80 Id at 1359 n. 21.
81 Id at 1359 n. 22.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1982]

presented the play in the form of a 1930's movie double feature. The
first act presented musical skits spoofing 1930's musicals and included comic imitations of Judy Garland, Jeanette McDonald, Fred
Astaire and others. In the second act, he adapted Chekov's The Bear
into the style of a Marx Brother's movie, complete with imitations of
82
Chico, Groucho, and Harpo.
Although Day/ANight resembles the Big El Show in that both rely
on imitations as a form of entertainment, Day/Nght is distinguishable in several important aspects. Initially, the Marx Brothers imitations in Day/Night must be viewed as a segment of a distinct work
that parodies and comments on a specific entertainment genre 1930's Hollywood movies.8 3 In addition, the Marx Brothers segment
does not merely recreate an old Marx Brothers film. Rather, the
playwright expended substantial creative energy to adapt a serious
dramatic work - Chekov's The Bear - into a Marx Brothers style com-

edy. In short, "[t]he original work, [the original Marx Brothers characterizations,] became part of a new and different work which
derives its popularity from the added creative elements. '8 4 It is thus
legal parody under the Goetsch analysis and would receive first
amendment protection in any right of publicity action.
In Day/Nght, the court actually focused on two analytical
strains which the Goetsch analysis avoids. The court first noted that
"[w]here the use [of the Marx Brothers' characterizations] is largely
for commercial purposes, the right of publicity prevails. '8 5 Under
the Goetsch analysis, however, once a court classifies a work as legal
parody, the commercial motivation for producing the work is irrelevant. 86 In addition, the court focused on the play's "wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters. ' 87 Again, under the
Goetsch analysis, the work receives first amendment protection regardless of the amount of material appropriated from the original
work, once the court classifies its as a legal parody.8 8
Presly and Marx represent extremes under the Goetsch analysis.
The gray area between those works devoid of, and those works filled
with creativity may present problems when courts try to decide
82
83
work,
84
85
86
87
88

TIME, May 12, 1980, at 83.

"Parodies which satirize entire genres. . . rather than a specific previously published
also qualify as legal parodies." Goetsch, supra note 62, at 43-44.
Presly, 513 F. Supp. at 1359 n. 21.
Marx, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2230.
See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
Marx, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2230.
See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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whether a work is legal parody. Three factors the courts should consider are: (1) in what context does the imitator appear? 9 (2) does the
author or performer contribute something other than the imitation
and?' (3) does the copy deviate substantially from the original
work? 91

These factors would focus a court's examination on those aspects
of creativity and comment central to a legal parody determination.
Essentially, the question is whether the imitation is sufficiently altered such that it is no longerjust an imitation. Although some balancing results, it is factual and not abstract, unlike the first
amendment - right of publicity balancing.
Application of the Goetsch analysis would change the result in
Marx. On the other hand, this analysis would uphold right of publicity actions against imitations that add little or no creative thought.
The Goetsch analysis would also provide a standard that gives notice
to imitators and controls judicial discretion, thus eliminating the
present uncertainty in theatrical imitation-right of publicity actions.
The balancing inherent in this analysis, with its shift from the abstract to the factual, adequately protects celebrities' right of publicity
and artists' first amendment interests. Further, under the Goetsch
analysis, the courts would continue to protect celebrities from imita93
92
tions involving deception, misrepresentation and advertisements.
Conclusion
Right of publicity actions often conflict with the first amendment guarantee of free expression. 94 Courts have attempted to resolve this conflict by applying a variety of standards. 95 In theatrical
imitation cases, the courts should adopt the Goetsch analysis. This
analysis would preclude right of publicity actions against works that
89 For example, does the imitation comprise the entire performance, as in Preslqy, or is the
imitation part of a more extensive production, as in Marx?
90 In the Big El Show, the only talent showcased was the imitator's ability to mimic Elvis
Presley, while Day/Nkght showcased Frank Vosburgh's writing skill as much as it did the
mimics' talent.
91 The Big El Show was virtually a replica of an Elvis Presley concert. Day/Ntght, on the
other hand, featured impersonators of well known comics, the Marx Brothers, in an adaptation of a serious dramatic work by Anton Chekov.
92 See notes 23-30 supra. The Goetsch analysis would not affect application of the

Spahn/Hiks standard.
93 See notes 32-34 supra. The Geotsch analysis would also not affect the Frsch standard
in cases of disguised commercial advertisements.
94 See notes 5-7 sura and accompanying text.
95 See notes 8-43 supra and accompanying text.
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are distinct, creative parodies of the original works. Adoption of the
Goetsch analysis would provide more certainty in theatrical imitation cases, giving more notice to third parties as to what are protected first amendment works. In addition, while expanding the first
amendment protection currently provided under the ad hoc analysis,
the Goetsch standard would protect a celebrity's right of publicity
interest where the standard for protection of literary works would
not.96 The important interests on both sides of the theatrical imita-

tion question demand adoption of a clear, ascertainable standard,
which Goetsch provides.
John C Greiner

96 But see Marx, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2230, where the Goetsch analysis would not protect the
celebrity's right of publicity interest.

